Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of
Public Policy and Practice
Volume 42

Issue 1

Article 4

2021

The Price of Prime—Consumer Privacy in the Age of Amazon
Ariana Aboulafia
Greg Fritzius
Tessa Mears
Macy Nix

Follow this and additional works at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the
Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Aboulafia, Ariana; Fritzius, Greg; Mears, Tessa; and Nix, Macy (2021) "The Price of Prime—Consumer
Privacy in the Age of Amazon," Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice: Vol. 42 : Iss. 1
, Article 4.
Available at: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol42/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law Reviews and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mitchell
Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice by an
authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open
Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

THE PRICE OF PRIME—CONSUMER PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF AMAZON
Ariana Aboulafia, Greg Fritzius, Tessa Mears & Macy Nix

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 139

II.

THE TROUBLESOME TRIFECTA ......................................................................................... 141
A.

Amazon Alexa.............................................................................................................. 141

B.

Amazon Rekognition ................................................................................................... 144

C.

Ring ............................................................................................................................. 147

III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ..................................................................................................... 150
A.

Policy—The Prime Act................................................................................................ 150

B.

Social—Shareholder Pressures & Watchdog Partners .............................................. 152

C.

Technological—Terms of Use Questionnaires ........................................................... 154

D.

Antitrust....................................................................................................................... 155

IV.

POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS, AUTHOR RESPONSES, AND CONCLUSION ............................. 156

APPENDIX A: THE PRIME ACT ................................................................................................. 160
APPENDIX B: TERMS OF USE QUESTIONNAIRES ....................................................................... 164

138

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to imagine a world without Amazon. The behemoth tech corporation—which
began as a humble attempt by entrepreneur Jeffery Bezos to sell books on the Internet 1—had a
market cap of $1.6 trillion as of November 2020, and its net income rose almost 200% for the third
quarter of 2020, compared to the same three-month period in 2019. 2 And, far from its bookstore
origins, Amazon currently sells nearly anything that one could ask for via its online website, which
hosts around 300 million active accounts as of 2017. 3 Amazon Prime, which offers users free twoday shipping (among other perks) for a fee has over 150 million subscribers worldwide as of 2019. 4
And, as if that weren’t enough, Amazon owns dozens of subsidiaries that span across several
industries. 5 Amazon also produces consumer electronics including Kindle e-readers, Fire tablets,
Fire TV sticks, and Amazon Echo devices (which are enabled with Alexa, a personal virtual
assistant).
Taking all of this into account, it is clear that from the food that one eats, to the films that
one watches, the books that one reads, to the incidentals that one purchases, Amazon touches—or,
at the very least, has the potential to touch—nearly every aspect of a consumer’s life. As such,
assuming one cares about consumer privacy, Amazon’s privacy policies (which apply to users of

1

Makeda Easter & Paresh Dave, Remember When Amazon Only Sold Books?, L.A.TIMES (June 18, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-history-20170618-htmlstory.html.
2
Nathan Reiff, How Amazon Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov 6, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/howamazon-makes-money-4587523.
3
Erik Mathes, 10 Amazon Statistics That Will Shock Every Seller, SELLERLABS (Aug. 12, 2019),
https://www.sellerlabs.com/blog/10-amazon-statistics-will-shock-every-seller/.
4
Id.
5
Some of Amazon’s most well-known subsidiaries include Amazon Prime Video (an instant media streaming
service), Amazon Music (which streams music), Audible (an audiobook service), Amazon Publishing (which
publishes books in both the print and e-book format on their website), Amazon Studios (a film production
company), Twitch (a video game streaming service), Whole Foods Market (a brick and mortar grocery store),
Zappos (an online shoe retailer) and Amazon Web Services (a comprehensive cloud computing platform). For a
more expansive list of Amazon’s subsidiaries, see Leticia Miranda, These Are All the Businesses You Never Knew
Were Owned by Amazon, BUZZFEED NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/leticiamiranda/these-are-all-thebusinesses-you-never-knew-were-owned-by (last updated July 11, 2019).
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all of Amazon’s subsidiaries as well) become relevant. And, while many provisions of Amazon’s
privacy policies are worrisome, it may be particularly concerning both for Amazon consumers and
for anyone else who cares about consumer privacy that Amazon does not notify users about
government data requests, or promise not to “sell out” users (to governments or law enforcement,
for surveillance purposes). 6 On the contrary, in fact, Amazon’s privacy policies state that “[w]e
release account and other personal information when we believe release is appropriate to comply
with the law; enforce or apply our Conditions of Use and other agreements; or protect the rights,
property, or safety of Amazon, our users, or others.” 7 Indeed, it was these factors (along with
others) that caused an international digital rights group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, to
award Amazon a paltry two out of five stars in their 2017 rating of tech companies’ commitment
to protecting consumer privacy. 8 In comparison, that same year other tech giants—including
Adobe, Dropbox, Lyft, Pinterest, Uber, and WordPress—received five out of five stars. 9
Clearly, Amazon could stand to improve its polices on consumer privacy. However, there
are three Amazon products, partnerships and services—Alexa, Ring, and Rekognition—that are
particularly concerning from the standpoint of not only protecting the privacy of consumers, but
also of those who choose not to use these products and yet have their privacy rights implicated
regardless. Part II of this paper will discuss these services and why their privacy implications are
especially alarming. It will then propose and discuss four solutions in Part III: a new statute called
the PRIME Act, a social solution consisting of increased shareholder pressure, a technological
solution comprised of terms of use questionnaires, and an antitrust solution. These solutions can

6

Rainey Reitman, Who Has Your Back? Government Data Requests 2017, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 10, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2017.
7
Amazon Privacy Policy, AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468496
(last updated Jan. 1, 2020).
8
See Reitman, supra note 6.
9
Id.
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mitigate some of the more detrimental impacts of Amazon’s consumer privacy policies as they
currently stand. The final section will outline potential responses and objections to these proposed
solutions and reforms, and will conclude by arguing that it is possible to allow Amazon to continue
its economic growth and technological innovation while still regulating its practices, particularly
those that affect consumer privacy.
II.

THE TROUBLESOME TRIFECTA

A. Amazon Alexa
As previously mentioned, Amazon Alexa is a digital voice assistant software created by
Amazon that responds to users’ voice commands. 10 While Alexa is not a standalone product, the
Alexa software was first introduced in November 2014 as a feature embedded in Amazon Echo
devices, a portable smart speaker meant for homes, 11 which was advertised as a family-friendly
product designed to help with tasks such as creating to-do lists, setting alarms, answering questions
and providing real-time information such as the news or the current weather. 12 Between its release
in November 2014 and January 2019—less than five years—over 100 million Alexa-enabled
devices have been sold by Amazon. 13
However, Alexa’s emergence in the marketplace has not been without controversy, most
of which stem from two issues. First, there have been several incidents of Alexa listening to
conversations without consumers’ knowledge or without their full consent. For example, while

10

Michael Bizzaco et al., What Is Alexa? Where Does She Come from? How Does She Work?, DIGIT. TRENDS (Nov.
25, 2020), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-do/.
11
Laura Lorenzetti, Forget Siri, Amazon Now Brings You Alexa, FORTUNE (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://fortune.com/2014/11/06/forget-siri-amazon-now-brings-you-alexa/.
12
See Top Tech, Introduction of Amazon Echo, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6V5I8HHFTNQ.
13
Dieter Bohn, Amazon Says 100 Million Alexa Devices Have Been Sold—What’s Next?, VERGE (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:00
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/4/18168565/amazon-alexa-devices-how-many-sold-number-100-milliondave-limp.
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Alexa is only supposed to record when a consumer uses a programmed “wake word” and asks it
to do so, consumers have reported that Alexa has sent recordings of their private conversations
without the users being aware that they had given Alexa any instructions to do so. 14 Alexa has also
been awakened by sounds of sex—which it mistakes for signs of distress—and recorded (and
stored) that audio. 15 And, to make matters worse, Amazon has recently considered doing away
with the “wake word” entirely, which would allow Alexa to listen in on conversations
indiscriminately. 16 Regarding consent, various organizations have accused Amazon of violating
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act because Alexa records minors under the age of 13
without their consent. 17 Amazon appears unfazed by these claims, as it currently sells Alexa
products designed and marketed specifically for children. 18
The second area of controversy surrounding Alexa and Alexa-enabled devices concerns
questions as to how the data collected by Alexa is ultimately used. For example, a team consisting
of over a thousand Amazon employees manually reads transcripts of Alexa recordings and/or
listens to its audio. 19 This, of course, means that anything that is recorded by Alexa—even if

14
Leia Klingel, Amazon Devices Recording, Sending Your Conversations?, FOX BUS. (May 25, 2018),
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/amazon-devices-recording-sending-your-conversations. It is worth noting
that Amazon claims that this incident was caused by the users unintentionally “waking” Alexa and prompting it to
record conversations, yet the users maintain that they never heard Alexa audibly respond to any of its supposed
triggers prior to it recording and sending the message in question.
15
Nick Parker, Alexa, Stop Being a Perv, SUN, https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/9611689/outrage-as-amazons-alexalistens-to-brits-having-sex-rowing-swearing-and-sharing-medical-news/ (last updated Aug. 2, 2019).
16
A.J. Dellinger, Amazon Considered Letting Alexa Listen to You Without a Wake Word, ENGADGET (May 23,
2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/05/23/amazon-alexa-recording-before-wake-word-patent/.
17
Mark Harris, Virtual Assistants Such as Amazon’s Echo Break US Child Privacy Law, Experts Say, GUARDIAN
(May 26, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/26/amazon-echo-virtual-assistantchild-privacy-law.
18
See Press Release, Amazon, Amazon Announces New Kindle Kids Edition, Fire HD 10 Kids Edition, and
FreeTime on Fire TV, Providing Access to Kid-Friendly Content—Now in Even More Places (Oct. 7, 2019, 9:04
AM), https://press.aboutamazon.com/news-releases/news-release-details/amazon-announces-new-kindle-kidsedition-fire-hd-10-kids-edition.
19
Matt Day et al., Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:34 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyone-listening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviewsaudio.
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accidentally recorded—can and will potentially be examined by a real person, who can then
forward those conversations to authorities if deemed necessary as per Amazon’s aforementioned
privacy policies. Indeed, as to this latter point, recordings from Alexa have been used by police in
at least one criminal investigation at the time of writing, and privacy advocates believe that this
may become more commonplace as time goes on, and Alexa-enabled devices become more
popular. 20
These controversies—and the several legal issues which are implicated by these
controversies—have not escaped attention from both legal scholars 21 and lawmakers. 22 These
advocates seem to be particularly worried by the Fourth Amendment implications of the utilization
of Alexa recordings in criminal investigations, considering it may be used as precedent to diminish
the reasonable expectation of privacy within the home, a long-held tenet of the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 23 This issue also implicates our understanding of the third-party search doctrine,
and whether or not it is a constitutional issue for Amazon to share user data for use in criminal
investigations when one considers that users allow their data to be shared with Amazon (a thirdparty) in the first place, and in doing so perhaps lose their right to protest the further sharing of
that data to law enforcement. 24 Given these questions and the implications of their answers, not
only for those who purposely purchase, install and utilize Alexa-enabled devices in their own
homes but also for potential visitors, advocates have also argued that there may be a duty for the

20

Eric Boughman et al., “Alexa, Do You Have Rights?”: Legal Issues Posed by Voice-Controlled Devices and the
Data They Create, ABA (July 20, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/07/05_boughman/.
21
Id.
22
See Letter from Christopher A. Coons, U.S. Sen., to Jeff Bezos, Chief Exec. Officer, Amazon, Inc. (May 23,
2019). In this letter, Coons requested information on the types of data Amazon collects, stores, and preserves from
Alexa, as well as the degree to which consumers control their personal information.
23
See Boughman, supra note 20.
24
Id.
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owners of Alexa-enabled devices to warn guests within their home that those devices are present,
and that they may be recorded at any time. 25 Amazon’s plans to roll out a new line of Alexaenabled devices meant to exist outside of the home (including headphones, rings, and other
“wearable tech” devices) 26 will only compound this particular problem, since these devices will
likely record non-consenting and unknowing members of the public in proximity to such devices.
In short, the privacy implications of Alexa are vast, and the protections of our current laws
appear inadequate to assure individuals that their privacy rights will not be easily exploited. And
there is little solace that the solutions will come from Amazon itself. Despite Amazon’s claims
that it takes user privacy seriously, some tech advocates describe these proclamations as inherently
disingenuous when compared to Amazon’s current practices and future plans. 27 Ideally, the
systematic and widespread application of the solutions advocated for within this paper will curb
the invasive practices of Amazon pertaining to not only Alexa-enabled devices, but all of
Amazon’s technologies, including Amazon Rekognition and Ring.
B. Amazon Rekognition
Like Amazon Alexa, Rekognition is not a standalone device; rather, it is an Application
Programming Interface (API) that supposedly provides “highly accurate facial analysis and facial
search capabilities” and can be integrated into any other web, mobile, or connected device

25
See Susie Coen, Alexa, Warn Our Guests that You’re Eavesdropping on Them: Google Chief Says People Should
Warn Visitors of Smart Speakers in Their Homes, DAILY MAIL, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article7577251/Google-chief-says-people-warn-visitors-smart-speakers-homes.html (last updated Oct. 16, 2019).
26
Ben Fox Rubin, Amazon’s Alexa Dives into Mobile World with Echo Earbuds, Glasses and Ring, CNET (Sept. 26,
2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazons-alexa-dives-into-mobile-world-with-echo-earbuds-glassesand-ring/.
27
Russell Brandom, To Use Alexa, You Have to Trust Amazon, VERGE (Sept. 26, 2019, 1:24 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/26/20885512/amazon-alexa-voice-assistant-privacy-features-trust (“This is what
Amazon does . . . . They make empty statements to sell their products and then continue to build a for-profit,
surveillance dragnet without oversight and accountability[,]” quoting Evan Greer, a deputy director at Fight for the
Future, a nonprofit advocacy group.).
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applications, including those operated by third-parties for personal or professional use. 28 Some key
features of Amazon Rekognition include object, scene, and activity detection; facial recognition;
facial analysis; pathing; unsafe content detection; celebrity recognition; and identifying text in
pictures. 29 Pinterest and C-SPAN have used Rekognition for object recognition and analytics 30—
it has even been used to identify guests at the royal wedding. 31 However, there are other, far more
nefarious uses for this technology.
There are several problems that arise from Amazon’s facial recognition software—
including significant issues with racial bias. 32 While these issues are concerning, the problem with
Rekognition that most directly impacts consumer privacy is the partnership between law
enforcement agencies and Rekognition. On the federal level, Immigration Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has utilized Rekognition to scan state driver’s license databases for undocumented
individuals, without the consent or knowledge of these individuals. 33 On a more local level, the
Washington County Sheriff currently partners with Rekognition, paying between $6 and $12 per

28

Amazon Rekognition: Automate Your Image and Video Analysis with Machine Learning, AMAZON WEB
SERVICES, (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
29
Id.
30
James Vincent, Sky News Will Use Facial Recognition to Identify Celebs and Nobility at the Upcoming Royal
Wedding, VERGE (May 4, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/4/17318354/royal-wedding-uk-facialrecognition-sky-news-date.
31
Id.
32
In 2018, the ACLU conducted a study using Rekognition on members of Congress. Through this study, the ACLU
built a face database and search tool using 25,000 publicly available arrest photos, and then searched that database
against public photos of every current member of the House and Senate using the default match settings that
Amazon sets for Rekognition. The software incorrectly matched twenty-eight members of Congress, identifying
them as other people who have been arrested for a crime. Nearly forty percent of Rekognition’s false matches in our
test were of people of color, even though they make up only twenty percent of Congress. For additional information
on this study, see Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with
Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28.
33
Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition.html.
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month for access to Rekognition to scan mugshot photos against real-time footage. 34 While certain
civilians may be comforted by the thought of their local police department going the extra mile to
solve serious crimes, this partnership has thus far almost exclusively been used to solve petty
crimes. For example, the Washington County Sheriff’s office took surveillance footage from a
store and then used Rekognition to run the screenshots from the footage against a mugshot database
to solve one crime in which a woman stole a pair of shoes. They did the same thing in another case
where a woman stole a $12 worth of gas from a hardware store. 35
Even outside of the traditional crime-stopping context, the partnership between cities and
Rekognition gives privacy advocates a pause––and for good reason. The city of Orlando, Florida
has attempted to partner with Rekognition in order to create a singular system of surveillance
throughout the entire city. Orlando’s Rekognition pilot program was pulled twice due to
insufficient resources; 36 however, if fully operable, this program would allow for real-time facial
recognition of any civilian via the integration of Rekognition into a network of cameras throughout
the city. 37 The director of this project, an employee of Amazon, attempted to minimize the
Orwellian appearance of the partnership by stating that it could be used innocuously, for city
officials to find out “. . . if the mayor of the city is in a place, or [if] there are persons of interest
they want to track.” 38 Regardless of these feeble attempts by Amazon to justify this partnership,

34

Elizabeth Dwoskin, Amazon is Selling Facial Recognition to Law Enforcement—For a Fistful of Dollars, WASH.
POST (May 22, 2018, 11:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/22/amazon-isselling-facial-recognition-to-law-enforcement-for-a-fistful-of-dollars/.
35
Ben Fox Rubin, Facial Recognition Overkill: How Deputies Cracked a $12 Shoplifting Case, CNET (Mar. 19,
2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/facial-recognition-overkill-how-deputies-solved-a-12-shopliftingcase/.
36
Facial Recognition Pilot Program, CITY OF ORLANDO, (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
37
Russel Brandom, Amazon is Selling Police Departments a Real-Time Facial Recognition System, VERGE (May 22,
2018, 11:06 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17379968/amazon-rekognition-facial-recognitionsurveillance-aclu.
38
Id.
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the privacy implications of a singular system of surveillance which allows the government to keep
a constant eye on all of its citizens and to utilize facial recognition software to know exactly who
they are watching at all times are clearly concerning to put it lightly. These privacy implications
are only compounded when one considers the potential for Rekognition to be integrated in personal
(rather than government-run) surveillance and home security systems––some of which, like
Ring, 39 are also owned by Amazon.
C. Ring
Ring is a smart security device company that was acquired by Amazon in 2018 for $839
million. 40 Ring’s product line includes floodlight video cameras and in-home security cameras, 41
but it is best known for its video doorbell which allows users to see, talk to, and record anyone and
anything that comes to their door. 42 Ring devices are integrated with a complementing mobile
application, Neighbors, where users can post videos directly from their Ring device as well as view
posts from other “neighbors” within a five-mile radius. 43 Notably, police also have a presence on
Neighbors—this is just one aspect of the troubling relationships between Ring and law

39

Amazon does not currently use facial recognition technology in Ring devices and has stated that it does not
collaborate with Amazon Rekognition. However, it has filed a facial recognition related patent application that could
identify “suspicious” people and then alert law enforcement, which illustrates the potential for the integration of
Rekognition with Ring devices and the privacy implications thereof. See Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring
Has Partnered with 400 Police Forces, Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019, 6:53PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-partnered-with-policeforces-extending-surveillance-reach/.
40
Rani Molla, How Amazon’s Ring is Creating a Surveillance Network With Video Doorbells, VOX (Sep. 24, 2019,
3:56 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/5/20849846/amazon-ring-explainer-video-doorbell.
41
RING, https://ring.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
42
Ring Video Doorbells, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/doorbell-cameras (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
43
Neighbors by Ring, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/neighbors (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
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enforcement, relationships which are so concerning that they have caused both Congress 44 and
numerous civil rights organizations to speak out. 45
Of the roughly eighteen thousand law enforcement agencies in the United States, Ring has
contracts with more than four hundred police departments across five hundred cities. 46 Ring’s CEO
has stated that the company’s goal is to “have every law enforcement agency on the police
portal.” 47 These partnerships grant police access to a direct portal on the Neighbors app where they
can access data related to consumers’ use of Ring and submit video footage requests. 48 Police
primarily use Neighbors by interacting with users, commenting on posts and asking users to file
police reports. 49 Through this use, Neighbors essentially provides a tool for police to seek out petty
crimes and ensure that they are formally reported, even if the victims of those crimes originally
had no intention of doing so. But, the partnership between Ring and police departments goes
further than a guaranteed presence on the Neighbors app. Indeed, when police want to acquire
video footage captured on a Ring camera that may not have been posted on the Neighbors app,
Ring will send a request to users located within a certain radius of the address of the crime
(provided by law enforcement), on behalf of the police, asking for assistance with an investigation.

44

Office of Ed Markey, Senator Markey Calls for Answers About Amazon Camera Doorbell Company’s
Partnerships with Police Departments (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senatormarkey-calls-for-answers-about-amazon-camera-doorbell-companys-partnerships-with-police-departments.
45
Open Letter Calling on Elected Officials to Stop Amazon’s Doorbell Surveillance Partnerships with Police, FIGHT
FOR THE FUTURE (Oct. 7, 2019, 2:18 PM), https://www.fightforthefuture.org/news/2019-10-07-open-letter-callingon-elected-officials-to-stop/.
46
Dell Cameron, Ring Gave Police Stats About Users Who Said ‘No’ to Law Enforcement Requests, GIZMODO
(Aug. 30, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://gizmodo.com/ring-gave-police-stats-about-users-who-said-no-to-law-e1837713840.
47
Ring Security System Program With Law Enforcement Raises Privacy Concerns, CBS NEWS (Aug. 29, 2019, 8:46
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ring-security-system-program-with-law-enforcement-raises-privacyconcerns/.
48
Caroline Haskins, Amazon is Coaching Cops on How to Obtain Surveillance Footage Without a Warrant, VICE
(Aug. 5, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/43kga3/amazon-is-coaching-cops-on-how-to-obtainsurveillance-footage-without-a-warrant.
49
Alfred Ng, Amazon’s Ring Wants Police to Keep These Surveillance Details from You, CNET (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-ring-wants-police-to-keep-these-surveillance-details-from-you/.
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According to Ring, users are not required to give video to police. 50 However, Amazon does guide
police on how to more successfully obtain footage from users through these requests, by providing
scripts to law enforcement, and giving them tips on how to adjust their tactics if they are
unsuccessful obtaining footage. 51 If users decline to share their video footage, police may contact
Amazon to obtain the footage regardless. 52 Notably, Ring’s privacy policy states that it may
provide a user’s footage to law enforcement based on a “good faith belief” that it is necessary to
comply with a “reasonable government request.” 53 In short, like its parent company, Ring retains
the right to give away its users’ footage and police may get the video footage requested either way.
As if implicating the privacy of both users and non-user passerby alike in the crime-solving
context were not bad enough, Ring also has a history of using customers’ doorbell footage for its
own advertising purposes. In a recent incident that garnered national media attention, Ring
published a Facebook advertisement that included footage of a woman looking around a car,
without obscuring her face. 54 The now-deleted advertisement asked users to identify and call the
police on the woman, describing her as a suspected thief. 55 Following backlash, the company has
now taken to blurring facial features in their advertisements. However, Ring’s privacy policy does
grant Ring and its licensees an “unlimited, irrevocable . . . right to use, distribute, store, delete,
translate, copy, modify, display, sell, create derivative works from and otherwise exploit” any
videos shared on Neighbors. 56 This clause essentially states that any footage captured by Ring, and

50

See Cameron, supra note 46.
See Haskins, supra note 48.
52
See Ng, supra note 49.
53
Ring Terms of Service, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/terms (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
54
Davey Alba & Ryan Mac, Ring is Using Its Customers’ Doorbell Camera Video for Ads. It Says It’s Allowed To,
BUZZFEED NEWS (June 7, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/amazon-ring-doorbellcompany-using-security-footage-for-ads.
55
Id.
56
See Ring Terms of Service, supra note 53.
51
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shared on Neighbors, can be used by Amazon for nearly any purpose and, again, the privacy
concerns illuminated by this incredibly permissive policy are clear. Through the proposed
solutions below, we aim to better equip users in understanding and defending themselves against
the privacy concerns that are implicated not only by these partnerships, but also by the
aforementioned issues related to Rekognition and Alexa as well.
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A. Policy—The Prime Act
In developing a legal solution to alleviate the privacy concerns associated with Amazon
products and services—specifically, Alexa, Rekognition, and Ring—the authors created a model
statute. This statute aims to strike a balance between allowing Amazon to continue innovating
without so gravely impacting consumer and non-consumer privacy. To this end, this bill—the
Privacy Rights of Individuals Management and Enforcement (PRIME) Act—prohibits certain
entities from using technology to identify or track an end user without obtaining the affirmative
consent of the end user. In drafting this bill, the authors took inspiration from the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the United States’ proposed federal bill entitled
the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act (CFRPA). 57 The remainder of this section will
break down the statute; the statute is also attached to this paper as a supplementary material.
Definitions. There are four definitions included in the PRIME Act: affirmative consent,
controller, personal data, and end user (which appears within the definition of personal data). These
definitions are modeled based on those found in the GDPR and CFRPA. 58

57

See generally Commission Regulation 2016/679, of European Parliament and of the Council of April 2016 on the
General Data Protection Regulation O.J. (L 199); Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847,
116th Cong. (2019).
58
Commission Regulation 2016/679, of European Parliament and of the Council of April 2016 on the General Data
Protection Regulation O.J. (L 199) Ch. I, art. 4; Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847, 116th
Cong. § 2 (2019).
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Prohibited Conduct. The PRIME Act makes it unlawful for Amazon and other tech
companies to collect personal data from users without affirmative consent; use personal data to
discriminate in violation of federal or state law; repurpose personal data; and share personal data
with an unaffiliated third party without affirmative consent. The vast majority of inspiration for
this portion of the Act was from the CFRPA.
Affirmative Consent. The PRIME Act also provides that Amazon and other tech
companies must not only obtain the affirmative consent of the user, but it must also be able to
demonstrate that the affirmative consent was obtained in clear, plain language. The language for
the portion of the Act concerning affirmative consent derives from the CFRPA, while the
requirement for clear and plain language is derived from the GDPR.
Transparency and the Right to Erasure. In a similar vein, the Transparency requirement
aims to ensure that tech companies like Amazon must make it clear to users what it intends on
doing with user data. The Right to Erasure provision gives users the right to have their data erased
in certain circumstances. Taking inspiration from the GDPR’s Right to Erasure provision, the
PRIME Act carves out three situations in which an end user has the right to have their data erased:
if the data is no longer necessary, if the data was unlawfully processed, or if the data must be erased
in compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject.
Exceptions. This Act carves out two exceptions for the release of personal data. The first
exception allows the disclosure of data related to criminal convictions, offenses, investigations, or
related security measure as long as warrants or subpoenas that are required by law are obtained. In
requiring a warrant or subpoena, the goal is to circumvent current practices illustrated by Ring and
Alexa particularly that have allowed police departments to obtain footage or audio with only a
request rather than a subpoena or warrant. The second exception would allow for the disclosure of
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data related to an emergency involving imminent danger, which essentially codifies the exigency
exception which is prevalent in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Enforcement and Penalties. As with the CFRPA, The Federal Trade Commission would
be responsible for enforcement of the PRIME Act. 59 In the case of lack of compliance with the
provisions of this Act, entities whose total worldwide annual turnover exceeded $1 billion would
be subject a fine of the greater of $10 million or two percent of the total worldwide annual turnover
of the preceding financial year of the controller. Entities whose total worldwide annual turnover is
less than $1 billion would be subject to a fine of two percent of the total worldwide annual turnover
of the preceding financial year of the controller. These numbers are taken from the GDPR’s penalty
provision, 60 and ensure that a powerhouse tech company like Amazon would be subject to the
larger of the two fines, while smaller tech companies would be subject to a significantly reduced
fine, in an effort to encourage the growth of these potential competitors while still ensuring that
they are abiding by basic privacy provisions.
B. Social—Shareholder Pressures & Watchdog Partners
In addition to the above policy solution, this paper proposes a social solution to Amazon’s
invasive practices by arguing that it is the role of Amazon’s shareholders, in cooperation with
watchdog organizations, to attempt to lead initiatives for better privacy practices at the company.
Such shareholder initiatives can fill the void left by lawmakers and hold Amazon accountable.
While it is oftentimes difficult for shareholder resolutions to make direct changes to company
policies of large tech companies due to the structure of voting rights, measures voted on by
shareholders can result in negative press for large tech companies, which can then result in changes
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in policies, if indirectly. 61 For example, shareholders have already pressured Amazon to avoid
using facial recognition technology by putting forth two measures asking Amazon to stop selling
Rekognition to government agencies and to do an audit of the privacy implications of the
technology. 62 While these measures have not yet tangibly changed Amazon’s policies, they have
at the very least forced Amazon to publicly explain the use of this technology, thus bringing
negative media attention onto the company and causing them to perhaps consider foregoing the
usage of Rekognition altogether. Similar economic pressure from shareholders, with the backing
of watchdog groups, can force Amazon to change other invasive practices across the company.
Indeed, privacy advocate groups have already worked with shareholder activists to drive change
at other large tech corporations. 63 These watchdog groups should make direct efforts to reach out
to the shareholders of Amazon so that they can work together in order to encourage changes the
company’s practices, particularly those that negatively impact user and non-user privacy.
There are many groups that would make ideal partners for such shareholder initiatives,
many of which have already been discussed in this paper. These include, but are not limited to, the
ACLU, 64 the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 65 Open MIC (an organization that already works
with activist shareholders to improve corporate governance at some of America’s biggest
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firestorm of criticism from shareholders demanding a reduction of his power and, despite Facebook rejecting
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companies), 66 and Fight for the Future (a nonprofit that has already criticized Amazon Alexa
products 67 and which currently tracks the implementation of facial recognition technology across
the country). 68 If watchdog groups like these work alongside Amazon shareholders, their ability
to generate negative press surrounding Amazon products’ privacy implications would be
compounded, thus enhancing their impact and potential to effect real change within the
corporation.
C. Technological—Terms of Use Questionnaires
One of the most important goals of both of the above solutions is to ensure that Amazon
users understand the potential privacy implications of using Amazon devices. In the spirit of
enhancing consumer knowledge, this paper proposes a technological solution (ideally used in
conjunction with the other solutions discussed in this paper) wherein users of Amazon products
and services would have to correctly answer three multiple-choice questions 69 regarding the
product’s new terms of service (compliant with the PRIME Act) before use. Examples of questions
that companies could use in these questionnaires are found in Appendix B. Importantly, these
quizzes would not prevent anyone who has purchased an Amazon device from being able to use
it, as users will be able to retake the questionnaire as many times as necessary. Instead, these
questions would represent an added layer of friction, giving consumers a chance to pause and
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Ban Facial Recognition, FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE, https://www.banfacialrecognition.com/map/ (interactive map
shows where facial recognition surveillance ishappening, where it’s spreading to next, and where there are local and
state efforts to rein it in) (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
69
Inspiration for this solution came from a tool implemented by NRKbeta (the tech arm of the Norwegian public
broadcaster NRK), which created a tool that required users to answer three multiple-choice questions about the
article before they were allowed to comment on that article. The company’s stated goal was to “ensure that the
commenters have actually read the story before they discuss it.” For more information, see Joseph Lichterman, This
Site is “Taking the Edge Off Rant Mode” by Making Readers Pass a Quiz Before Commenting, NIEMAN LAB (Mar.
1, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/this-site-is-taking-the-edge-off-rant-mode-by-makingreaders-pass-a-quiz-before-commenting/.
67

154

consider the implications of Amazon’s privacy practices before making an active choice whether
or not to use their newly purchased Amazon products. Ideally, terms of use questionnaires would
create a more highly educated user base regarding tech products’ privacy implications beyond
products produced by Amazon.
D. Antitrust
Another potentially viable solution to address the concerns over Amazon’s lack of
protection for consumer privacy would focus not precisely on Amazon’s privacy policies, but
rather on their anti-competitive behavior more generally. Recently, the Federal Trade Commission
launched an antitrust probe into Amazon, which could result in a major restructuring of the way
that Amazon does business and could eventually impact the corporation’s growth by reducing its
power within the larger e-commerce market. 70 But, how do antitrust probes help Amazon’s privacy
problem? The short answer is that they do not, exactly; however, one of the reasons why Amazon’s
privacy protections are so abysmal may be because they have no real market competition. That is,
given the choice between two corporations—Amazon, for example, and another e-commerce giant
which we will call “Congo,” 71 wherein Congo offered nearly everything that Amazon offered, but
with enhanced privacy protections—it is likely that consumers would choose the company with
greater privacy protections. Unfortunately, nothing like Congo has been able to break through the
market that is so dominated by Amazon. As such, it is at the very least worth watching the current
antitrust probe, to see if it creates space in the market for other competitors—some of whom may
very well be more devoted to consumer privacy protections than Amazon—to gain traction.
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IV.

POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS, AUTHOR RESPONSES, AND CONCLUSION

At this point, it is necessary to address the significant objections that these proposed
solutions would face by various groups, and how the authors, as proponents of the solutions, would
respond to those objections. Amazon and other tech companies are the most obvious entities that
would object to the proposed solutions. These companies would likely argue that enhanced
regulations would curtail their ability to continue producing innovative products. Furthermore,
Amazon may also argue that there will be detrimental economic effects (perhaps, in terms of
reduced numbers of jobs) 72 to any reform that would force Amazon to focus on protecting
consumers rather than on constant growth. 73 While it is undeniable that these corporations have
significant resources to fund lobbying efforts, there would be sufficient counter-efforts to fund
lobbyist groups that would favor protecting consumer privacy, particularly in the wake of the
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica crisis. Furthermore, the proposed reforms outlined in the
PRIME Act would require little time, energy, and resources to implement. The GDPR, after all,
already provides residents of the European Union the right to transparency, right to erasure, and
affirmative consent. Because companies like Amazon already do business within the European
Union, they already have the infrastructure in place to abide by the GDPR, and would simply have
to apply those same policies to their customers in the United States to comport with the PRIME
Act. There is no reason why they cannot do so.
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Between June 2016 and June 2017, Amazon added more jobs than 46 out of 50 U.S. states—keeping this in mind,
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Politicians and police departments would also likely object to our proposed reforms, on the
grounds that it is important to allow police to continue utilizing Amazon’s technologies to solve
crimes and enhance the safety of communities. These parties may argue that the privacy
implications dwarf in comparison to the importance of these goals. Our response to this rhetoric
would focus on the fact that these partnerships and technologies are most often used by police to
solve petty crimes (when they are utilized at all), 74 and that this use merely represents a
continuation of broken windows policing. 75 This policing style is problematic not only because it
disproportionately targets minorities, but also because it does not actually work. 76 Rather than
utilizing these technologies to continue to invest time and resources into this type of ineffective
policing, the authors would encourage police departments to explore new methods of policing and
crime solving that are more effective, and do not have such detrimental impacts on civilian privacy
rights.
Finally, and most ironically, consumers themselves may also protest the proposed
regulations, for several reasons. First and foremost, the average consumer is likely uneducated as
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to just how extreme the privacy implications are of using services like Alexa, Rekognition, and
Ring. Lack of public knowledge likely led to a corresponding lack of public concern over the
protection of consumer privacy in this context—concern that would be necessary to justify, for
example, the friction that would now be built into Amazon products through the terms of use
questionnaires. The authors’ response to these objections would be to ensure that watchdog groups
and community partners properly educate consumers as to the myriad of ways that their lives can
be negatively impacted by the current lack of privacy protections, and how the proposed reforms
ameliorate those issues. While some may argue that consumers live in a post-privacy world, 77 the
importance of privacy as a closely-held American value and legal concept reflects that the desire
for at least some level of privacy is an aspect of human nature. 78 The advent of technology has not
yet completely obliterated this innate, uniquely human need for privacy—a need, and a right, that
these proposed reforms aim to protect, to the ultimate benefit of even the most reluctant consumer.
Amazon is truly a technological giant, with an empire that spans across various industries
online and off. Particularly in light of Amazon’s forthcoming expansion of Alexa-enabled devices,
as well as its partnerships with police through Ring products and Rekognition services, it is clearer
now than ever that Amazon’s privacy problem goes far beyond consumers and has the potential to
impact each and every person in the United States, if not the world. Through a multidisciplinary
approach focusing on law, policy, and technology, there are solutions to these problems. However,
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lawmakers and advocates must rapidly address the grave privacy concerns outlined in this paper
before their full, detrimental impact is realized.

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
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V.

APPENDIX A: THE PRIME ACT

Privacy Rights and Information Management Enforcement Act
(PRIME Act)
A BILL to prohibit certain entities from using various technologies
to identify or track an end user without obtaining the affirmative
consent of the end user.
This Bill lays down rules relating to the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and rules
relating to the free movement of personal data.
This Bill protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal
data.
The free movement of personal data within the United States shall
be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected with
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data.
1. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(a) Affirmative Consent. The term ‘affirmative consent’ means
the consent of an end user that involves an individual,
voluntary, and explicit agreement to the collection and data
use policies of a controller.
(b) Controller. The term ‘controller’ means a covered entity
that, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data.
(c) Personal Data. The term ‘personal data’ means any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(‘end user’); an identifiable natural person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural
person.
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2. PROHIBITED CONDUCT.
(a) In General. Except as provided in Section 6, it shall be
unlawful for a controller to knowingly—
(1) use various technologies, including, but not limited
to, virtual assistants, voice recognition software,
facial recognition software, video cameras, and/or
microphones to collect personal data, unless the
controller obtains from an end user affirmative consent
in accordance with Section 3;
(2) use personal data to discriminate against an end user
in violation of applicable Federal or State law;
(3) repurpose personal data for a purpose that is different
from those presented to the end user under Section
2(a)(1); or
(4) share the personal data with an unaffiliated third
party without affirmative consent that is separate
from the affirmative consent required under Section
2(a)(1).
3. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT.
(a) Where processing is based on consent, the controller must
be able to demonstrate that the end user has consented to
processing of his or her personal data.
(b) The controller must present the terms of consent in an
intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and
plain language.
4. TRANSPARENT INFORMATION REGARDING PROCESSING OF PERSONAL
DATA.
(a) The controller shall provide information related to the
processing of personal data to the end user in a concise,
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using
clear and plain language. The information shall be provided
in writing, or where appropriate, by electronic means.
(b) The end user shall have the right to obtain from the
controller access to the personal data and following
information:
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(1) the purposes of processing;
(2) the personal data collected and the length of retention
by the controller of such personal data; and
(3) the existence of the right to request from the
controller erasure of personal data or restriction of
processing of personal data concerning the end user.
5. WITHDRAWING CONSENT AND ERASURE OF PERSONAL DATA.
(a)

The end user retains the right to withdraw his or her
consent to the processing of his or her personal data at
any time, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 6
herein. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.

(b)

The end user shall have the right to obtain from the
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or
her without undue delay and the controller shall have the
obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where
one of the following grounds applies:
(1) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation
to the purposes for which they were collected or
otherwise processed;
(2) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; or
(3) the personal data have to be erased for compliance
with a legal obligation in Federal or State law to
which the controller is subject.

6. EXCEPTIONS.
This Bill shall not apply to the processing of personal data—
(a)

(b)

related to criminal convictions, offenses, investigations,
or related security measures, subject at all times to any
and all warrant or subpoena requirements as required by
law; and
related to an emergency involving imminent danger or risk
of death or serious physical injury to an individual.

The data processed under the circumstances described in this
Section shall be processed under the control of official authority
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or when the processing is authorized by a State law providing for
appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of end users.
7. ENFORCEMENT.
The Federal Trade Commission shall be tasked with enforcement of
this Act pursuant to the applicable terms and provisions as if the
Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.) was
incorporated into and made a part of this Act.
8. PENALTIES.
Entities who violate these provisions shall be subject to a fine
in the amount of the greater of $10,000,000 or 2% of the total
worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year of the
violating controller.
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VI.

APPENDIX B: TERMS OF USE QUESTIONNAIRES

The following represent sample questions that users would have to answer prior to using their
newly-purchased Amazon products. It is the hope of the authors that these questions would
facilitate the education of Amazon consumers by illuminating key provisions of the PRIME Act.
First Sample Question:
Amazon reserves the right to share your personal data with third-party advertisers:
(a) True or (b) False.
For this question, under the PRIME Act, Amazon may only share a user’s personal data with thirdparty advertisers once the user gives affirmative consent to process his or her data for such purpose.
Second Sample Question:
If you wish for Amazon to delete your personal data from its records, how do you make such
request? (a) Email datainfo@amazon.com; (b) Call 1-800-856-3232; (c) Go to user settings;
(d) All of the above.
This question incorporates another important provision in the PRIME Act, the right to erasure,
highlighting the various ways a user may request Amazon delete his or her personal data.
Third Sample Question:
Under what circumstances does Amazon have the right to share your personal data with law
enforcement? (a) At any time; (b) With a valid warrant and/or subpoena as required by law;
(c) When you are using Amazon Ring.
Because Amazon may only share a user’s personal data with a valid warrant and/or subpoena under
the proposed PRIME Act, this question provides users with the security and notice that they have
regulations regarding how or what personal data is being shared and with whom.

The above figure represents a prompt that a user would see when
attempting to complete setup for an Alexa-enabled Echo device.
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